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Abstract 7 
Emerging economies with rapidly growing population and energy demand, own some of the most 8 
expensive power plants in the world. We hypothesized that corruption has a relationship with the 9 
capital cost of power plants in developing countries such as Bangladesh. For this study, we analyzed 10 
the capital cost of 61 operational and planned power plants in Bangladesh. Initial comparison study 11 
revealed that the mean capital cost of a power plant in Bangladesh is twice than that of the global 12 
average. Then, the statistical analysis revealed a significant correlation between corruption and the 13 
cost of power plants, indicating that higher corruption leads to greater capital cost. The high up-front 14 
cost can be a significant burden on the economy, at present and in the future, as most are financed 15 
through international loans with extended repayment terms. There is, therefore, an urgent need for the 16 
review of the procurement and due diligence process of establishing power plants, and for the 17 
implementation of a more transparent system to mitigate adverse effects of corruption on 18 
megaprojects. 19 
1 Introduction 20 
Bangladesh is the world’s eighth most populous country of 161 million people with annual 21 
population and GDP growth rates of 1.2% and 6.6% respectively (WB, 2016). While the population 22 
grew linearly, electricity consumption per capita increased exponentially since 1970, as shown in 23 
Figure 1A and G. The GDP-electricity elasticity of the country exhibits a strong linear relationship 24 
(R2= 0.989); electricity consumption increased by 4.15 kWh/capita for every US$ increase in 25 
GDP/capita in 1971-2011 (Figure 2). Moreover, past research indicates a unidirectional causal 26 
relationship is running from electricity consumption to investment and economic growth in 27 
Bangladesh—implying that over time, increasing electricity consumption results in higher economic 28 
growth (Masuduzzaman, 2012). Therefore, the government aimed towards giving access to electricity 29 
all households by 2021 (BPDB, 2015). The causal relationship between economic growth and 30 
electricity consumption illustrated in Figure 2 and available literature suggested that, as more people 31 
get access to electricity, the demand of electric power may increase significantly as Bangladesh aims 32 
at transition from a lower-middle-income to a middle-income country by 2021 (MoF, 2011) and 33 
developed by 2040 (FE, 2015; Jalil & Islam, 2010). The required additional economic growth is 34 
expected to result from the expansion and development of the energy-intensive manufacturing and 35 
service sectors (ILO & IILS, 2013; Nath, 2012; ADB, 2016).  36 
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The power sector in Bangladesh underwent several significant restructurings since its humble 37 
beginning at the turn of the 20th century. Electricity was provided only to the wealthy residents in the 38 
capital with small power plants (Omprasad, 2016) but gradually shifted its focus towards serving 39 
essential businesses and industries by 1947 (Ebinger, 2011). Post-independence evolution of the 40 
power sector is illustrated in Figure 1, which commenced with the establishment of Bangladesh 41 
Power Development Board (BPDB) and Rural Electrification Board (REB) in 1972 and 1977, to 42 
foster economic development in urban and rural areas respectively (BPDB, 2017; BREB, 2016). In 43 
light of increasing demand in divisional cities and the need for interconnection, East and West zones 44 
were connected by a 230 kV transmission line in 1982 (Ebinger, 2011). Despite the expansion of the 45 
grid, most of the population did not have access to uninterrupted electricity supply (Figure 1B). 46 
Morover, only 62.4% of the population has access to grid electricity in 2014 (WB, 2016). 47 
National Energy Policy 1994 paved the way for deregulation to encourage broader participation in 48 
power generation (Ebinger, 2011). Publicly-owned Rural Power Company Limited (RPCL) was set 49 
up as the first independent power producer (IPP) in the same year (Mourshed, 2013). Privately 50 
owned IPPs started operation in 1997, under the build-own-operate (BOO) model of public-private 51 
partnership (PPP). The effects of increased generation can be seen in the economic growth in the 52 
subsequent decades. The average GDP growth rate of 3.8% in the 1980s rose to 4.8%, 5.6%, 6.2% by 53 
1990s, 2000s and mid-2010s respectively (Figure 1C). Further deregulation allowed the 54 
establishment of rental power plants (RPPs) on 3- and 15-year contracts to meet the peak demand 55 
(Figure 1E) (MoF, 2009).  56 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 57 
Most RPPs are oil based that relies on imported petroleum as Bangladesh has insufficient oil reserve. 58 
By increasing oil dependency (Mujeri, et al., 2014), the energy sector was exposed to the volatile 59 
international oil market (Mourshed, 2013). Energy sector subsidies have escalated because of 60 
growing import prices for fuels to encounter the accelerated energy demand (Mujeri, et al., 2014). 61 
Moreover, the lack of adequate governance acted as an incentive for corruption to grow in the energy 62 
sector of Bangladesh (Khan & Rasheduzzman, 2013; Ahmed, 2011; Khatun & Ahamad, 2013). 63 
Public sector generation capacity has increased exponentially between 1970 and 1997. The growth in 64 
the public sector slowed down when the private sector began supplementing generation in 1997 65 
(Figure 1E and F). Majority of the increase since 1997 came from the private sector and the trend is 66 
projected to continue towards an installed capacity of 33.7 GW by 2030 (JICA & TEPCO, 2011) 67 
from 13.7 GW in 2017 (BPDB, 2017).  68 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 69 
In the case of fuel types, increased oil-based RPPs have changed the generation fuel-mix within five 70 
years of their expansion. Figure 1H illustrates that 80% of installed capacity in 2010 was based on 71 
natural gas (hereafter gas only), which reduced to 68% in 2015 (MoF, 2010). Although the increase 72 
in oil-based generation was suggested as short-term quick-fix to meet the burgeoning growth in 73 
demand for electricity, the overall direction of generation fuel mix is sub-optimal. The 2010 Power 74 
Sector Master Plan (PSMP2010) focuses on coal-based generation increase to a fuel mix of coal-gas-75 
others (50%-25%-25%) in 2030 (JICA & TEPCO, 2011), which is a significant departure from the 76 
mix of gas-liquid fuel-renewables (54%-28%-8%) in 1980 (Figure 1D). Although the number of 77 
privately owned power plants are five times in number than that of public ones, public sectors have 78 
1.66 times greater installed capacity than that of the private counterpart (BPDB, 2017). Most of the 79 
public generation capacity in Bangladesh is divided into four subsidiaries such as Ashuganj Power 80 
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Station Company Limited (APSCL), Electricity Generation Company of Bangladesh (EGCB), North-81 
West Power Generation Company Limited (NWPGCL) and West Zone Power Distribution Company 82 
Limited (WZPDCL). BPDB is the sole purchaser of the generated electricity, which is then 83 
transmitted via the Power Grid Company of Bangladesh Limited (PGCB) and distributed by State-84 
owned area-based distribution companies. At present, bulk generation is centralized and mostly fossil 85 
fuel based. However, there are decentralized renewable power generation projects such as mini-grid, 86 
solar home systems (SHS) have been operational and under development for off-grid rural and 87 
remote areas. The government have targeted to generate 10% of the total electricity from renewable 88 
resources by 2021 (IDCOL, 2017). Although, IDCOL is aiming towards total SHS installed capacity 89 
of 200 MW by 2021, and installing 50 solar mini-grid by 2018 (IDCOL, 2017), the cumulative 90 
capacity of the off-grid generation will contribute very little to the electricity supply. Bangladesh 91 
takes a considerable amount of loans from national and international funding bodies for establishing 92 
power plants. Therefore, they would need to borrow a significant amount of loan to construct the 93 
substantial number of stations to achieve a 20 GW of additional installed capacity by 2030 than that 94 
of 2017 (BPDB, 2017; JICA & TEPCO, 2011). With considerable capital costs involved and 95 
previous evidence of corruption in the energy sector (Khan & Rasheduzzman, 2013; Ruth, 2002) as 96 
well as in public procurement (Mahmood, 2010), the utilization of massive amount of money can 97 
prove to be a significant concern in Bangladesh.  98 
There have been different studies on the relationship between corruption and cost of big public 99 
projects. Study on Italian high-speed railways megaprojects demonstrated that corruption worsens 100 
both cost and temporal performance (Locatelli, et al., 2017). This study also identified the project 101 
contexts such as the discretionary power of officials, economic rents of policy/decision makers and 102 
weak institutions would make a country ideal for corruption. Another study demonstrated that capital 103 
cost of IPPs selected without competitive bidding was 44-56% higher than that of with competitive 104 
bidding in developing countries including Bangladesh (Phadke, 2009). However, only two projects 105 
with competitive bidding (4.87% of the total projects analysed) were considered in the case of 106 
Bangladesh. Therefore, the result was generic for developing countries, and the conclusion was not 107 
robust for Bangladesh. In another research, the Malaysian context was analysed to find the reasons 108 
behind corruption were an abuse of power, opportunity and moral compromise within the 109 
government officials (Othman, et al., 2014). Also, different studies suggest that the ongoing 110 
corruption can be controlled via random and regular supervision, severe punishment and prosecution 111 
of corrupt personnel, and anti-corruption awareness development (Zou, 2006; De Chiara & Livio, 112 
2017). Although the literature suggests that government personals are mostly responsible for active 113 
corruption by asking bribes, the private sector can also contribute by acting as passive corruption 114 
through approaching bureaucrats by offering bribes (Capasso & Santoro, 2017). However, there is a 115 
gap in the literature regarding studies on cost evolution of energy sector in developing economies 116 
such as Bangladesh, and their relation to corruption, due to the lack of political transparency and 117 
data. There are two objectives of this paper. Initially, to investigate the capital cost of establishing 118 
various power plants in Bangladesh and compare with other countries, regions and world, to find any 119 
differences. Furthermore, to understand the reason behind the differences, we hypothesized that 120 
corruption might have influenced the capital cost of power plants in Bangladesh. The correlation 121 
between the capital cost of the power plants and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Bangladesh 122 
was examined to test the hypothesis.  123 
2 Methodology 124 
The study was conducted in three stages. First, annual (BPDB, 2008; BPDB, 2009; BPDB, 2010; 125 
BPDB, 2011; BPDB, 2012; BPDB, 2013; BPDB, 2014; BPDB, 2015; KPCL, 2014), project 126 
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(APSCL, 2015; CPGCBL, 2015; EGCBL, 2015; APSCL, 2015) and financial aid reports (IDCOL, 127 
2015; WB, 2017) from national bodies and international organizations were reviewed to develop a 128 
capital cost database of power plants in Bangladesh. Capital cost refers to all the expenses incurred 129 
before a plant becomes operational and comprises the cost associated with the acquisition of land; 130 
permits and legal matters; plant equipment and construction; financing; and the commissioning of the 131 
plant. Independent scrutiny of public expenditure does not feature strongly in Bangladesh’s 132 
governance structure. Hence, the total capital cost or the breakdown of the capital cost of all the 133 
operational power plants is not publicly available. There were 100 public power plants in January 134 
2016, of which 96 were operational (BPDB, 2017). We collected primary data such as installed 135 
capacity, commissioning year, fuel and owner of 165 units from 113 public and private operational 136 
Bangladeshi power plants in January 2016. The number of public and private owned units were 80 137 
(6968 MW) and 85 (5566 MW) respectively. Among the operational units, ninety-five utilize gas, 138 
and seven are dual fuel type, of which four can use gas and heavy fuel oil (HFO). The rest of the 139 
three dual-fuel plants utilize high-speed diesel (HSD) and gas. Moreover, only HFO and HSD based 140 
units were 32 and 23 respectively. Two units were coal-based, and four units were hydroelectric. 141 
Also, there was a 500 MW interconnection with India in Khulna. Due to data constraints, the capital 142 
cost of 61 fossils (gas, coal and petroleum) and renewable (nuclear, hydro, the wind and solar) power 143 
plants in Bangladesh commissioned since 1962 and planned up to 2030, were collected (Table 1). Of 144 
the 61 plants, 34 are operational, and 27 are under construction, repair or future planned. The study 145 
had to test the hypothesis with lower data constrain and bias generated by it because of unavailability 146 
of cost data. The government has started to provide cost data since 2007 through the annual reports 147 
(BPDB, 2017). With more data and transparency in the future, the studies regarding cost can be 148 
improved to make the power plants more cost-effective.  149 
Among the analyzed 61 power plant units, gas, HFO/HSD/duel fuel, coal, nuclear and renewable 150 
based were 34, 17, four, one and five respectively. Moreover, 48 are public, and thirteen are privately 151 
operated. All the future and under-construction power plants are government owned. Among the nine 152 
analyzed duel fuel power plant units, three utilize HFO and gas, of which two are public, and one is 153 
privately owned. Six duel fuel power plant units use HSD and gas, of which one is private, and five 154 
are publicly owned. There are only nine HFO based power plant units, of which two are planned for 155 
future and rest of them are operational. All the HFO based functional power plants are privately 156 
owned. In the case of coal-based power plants units, only two are functional, and three are planned 157 
for future, and all of them are publicly owned. Similarly, all the renewable power plants are 158 
government owned, of which one is the Kaptai hydroelectric plant (5 units) and two small solar 159 
energy plants. The only planned nuclear power plant (Rooppur 1 and 2) would be publicly owned 160 
too. Three phases (Unit 1 and 2; Unit 3; Unit 4 and 5) of Kaptai hydroelectric power plant was 161 
considered separately because three stages had different cost individually. Among the coal power 162 
generation technologies, domestic coal-fueled subcritical plants were built in Barapukuria. Moreover, 163 
two new ultra-supercritical plants are under construction which would operate with imported coal. 164 
Cost per installed capacity in kW in a specific year of construction of the power plant was calculated 165 
and converted to the US dollar (USD) equivalent using the currency exchange rate with Bangladeshi 166 
Taka (BDT) on December 31 of the same year, obtained from Bangladesh Bank (BB, 2016). In cases 167 
where a power plant is going to be built after 2015, the cost was converted to 2015 USD using  BDT 168 
to USD exchange rate on December 31, 2015. Then the historical cost data was converted using 169 
Consumer Price Index (Coinnews, 2016) of 2015 USD so that all cost can be compared on the 2015 170 
USD basis. 171 
<Insert Table 1 about here>  172 
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Second, country- and region-wise capital costs of power plants for the same technology used in 173 
Bangladesh were collected from the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Investment 174 
Outlook 2014 (IEA, 2014) for USA, Japan, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Europe, the Middle East and 175 
Africa. There were three data points for all the countries for 2012, 2020, and 2035. Data for Sri 176 
Lanka were collected from ‘Long-Term Generation Expansion Planning Studies 2015- 2034’ for 177 
2015 (Samarasekara & Silva, 2015). In the case of USA, further data on cost and performance of 178 
power generation technologies were collected from National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 179 
to augment the IEA data (NREL, 2012). There were ten data points for the cost data from NREL for 180 
2008, 2010, 2015, 2020, 2025, 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045 and 2050. Also, CPI score between 1995 and 181 
2016 was collected from Transparency International (TI) (TI, 2017). 182 
Third, the average cost of power plants in Bangladesh was compared with that of the identified 183 
countries, regions and the World using 2015 as a base year. The evolution of cost was also analysed 184 
for both public and private sectors in Bangladesh. Pearson’s test was conducted at normalised capital 185 
cost and CPI score to examine the effect of corruption on power plant capital cost in Bangladesh. CPI 186 
data is available only from 1995, which reduced the sample size down to 31 for the correlation study. 187 
Among the collected cost data, power plants commissioned from 2004 to 2015 were considered. 188 
There were no cost data available for any power plants established between 1995 and 2003. There 189 
were also some cost data for power plants built before 1995. As the CPI index started in 1995, the 190 
cost data before that was not considered for the correlation study. As the sample size is less than 50, 191 
Shapiro-Wilk and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality were conducted (Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 192 
2012) and Table 2 indicated that the distribution of interval data was normal, supporting the selection 193 
of Pearson’s test. 194 
<Insert Table 2 about here>  195 
3 Discussion 196 
Power generation technology is the critical factor for the variation in the capital cost. For this study, 197 
initially, capital cost of various public and private power plants in Bangladesh with varied 198 
technologies such as gas turbines (GT) and combined-cycle power plant (CCPP); subcritical and 199 
ultra-supercritical plants; hydroelectric; nuclear and solar PV plants were compared with the world 200 
average, to find out the cost difference. When the cost of GT and steam turbines (ST) are compared, 201 
public power plants (hereafter plants) in Bangladesh are found to be approximately 2.2 times more 202 
expensive than that of the world mean (Figure 3A). The cost of public GTs is even higher, around 1.5 203 
times than the private plants in Bangladesh. In the case of CCPP, public plants’ mean is 1.2 and 1.7 204 
times more expensive than that of the world mean and the private plants’ mean respectively (Table 205 
3).  206 
The private CCPP with an average cost of $540 /kW, where publicly owned ones ranged from $853-207 
3005 /kW (Figure 3B). Moreover, future planned public CCPP cost range from $554-1612 /kW. 208 
Therefore, public CCPP in Bangladesh can be built with as low-cost as China ($568 /kW between 209 
2012 and 2020) to 19% greater than that of the highest cost of USA ($1358 /kW between 2015 and 210 
2020). The difference between lowest and highest capital cost of CCPP (going to be commissioned in 211 
2017) is $1058 /kW, the equivalent of constructing almost two CCPP plants in China. Cost difference 212 
can happen depending on the installed capacity. From long-term generation expansion planning study 213 
of Sri Lanka, two separate CCPP cost difference was $202 /kW depending on the installed capacity. 214 
The capital cost of CCPP-Auto Diesel of 144 and 288 MW was $853 and $1055 /kW respectively in 215 
Sri Lanka (Samarasekara & Silva, 2015), which means higher installed capacity may reduce cost. 216 
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However, in the case of Bangladesh, Siddhirganj 335 MW and Bibiana (South) 383 MW CCPP plant 217 
would cost $1612 /kW and $873 /kW respectively (operational by 2017). Though Bibiana (South) 218 
has 48 MW higher installed capacity than that of the Siddhirganj, it would cost approximately half. 219 
On the other hand in the private sector, Meghnaghat 450 MW CCPP (Unit 2) was constructed with 220 
$560 /kW in 2014.  221 
Figure 3C and D compares the cost of coal power plants. The subcritical coal plant, capital cost range 222 
from $1245-$1923 /kW, which is higher than the expense of the USA in the upper bound, and Africa 223 
in lower bound. However, the cost of the proposed ultra-supercritical power plant is going to be 224 
highest compared to the rest of the world (Figure 3D).     225 
<Insert Figure 3 about here> 226 
In the case of renewable energy, Bangladesh has been utilizing hydroelectricity from Kaptai power 227 
plant since 1962, making it the oldest active power plant in Bangladesh with a capital cost of 228 
$6408 /kW for Unit 1 and 2, and parts of Unit 3. Capital cost reduced with the construction of Unit 3 229 
in 1982, from $6408 /kW to $543 /kW (Figure 4B). Unit 3 was partially built during the construction 230 
of Unit 1 and 2 in 1962, which reduced the capital cost of completion of Unit 3 in 1982. However, 231 
the capital cost for Unit 4 and 5 was $1075 /kW, which was constructed in 1988. Unit 4 and 5 were 232 
constructed in an already established infrastructure with facilities such as dam, reservoir during the 233 
construction of Unit 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, Unit 4 and 5 had higher capital cost than that of Unit 3. 234 
While comparing the capital cost of Bangladeshi hydroelectric plants with the world, the cost 235 
reported for other countries were suggested for the construction of new plants. 236 
Currently, Bangladesh has small-scale solar home systems in households, but no significant 237 
commercial, operational project. Two large solar PV plants are going to be constructed in 2016-17 238 
with an installed capacity of 5 and 7 MW costing $4906 /kW and $2391 /kW respectively (Figure 239 
4A). Despite the continuing descending trend in cost, one is costing higher than that of the highest in 240 
the world for that year. Also, it is not clear why the difference in cost would be $2515 /kW for just 241 
2 MW, almost two times more than the cost of establishing similar technology power plant in China 242 
in 2020.    243 
In the case of nuclear power plants, the planned power plant in Bangladesh would be established with 244 
the assistance from Russia in 2024-2025. However, the capital cost would be 1.45 times than that of 245 
Russia and almost equivalent to Japan (Figure 4C).  246 
<Insert Figure 4 about here> 247 
Although power plants cost more in Bangladesh, the public plants are significantly more expensive 248 
than the private ones, indicating that there may as well be other factors related to public sector 249 
governance in play (Table 3). Further studies may reveal other factors such as political instability, 250 
inefficient project management leading to construction delays and eventual increase in cost. 251 
However, the deep-rooted and widespread corruption culture could have a higher impact on the 252 
capital cost of the power plants, which needs further investigation with more data. 253 
<Insert Table 3 about here>  254 
3.1 Cost evolution 255 
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The cost evolution in Bangladeshi public and private plants do not follow the same trend. The cost of 256 
most of the power generation technology in the world reduces with time (Neij, 2008). However, in 257 
the Bangladeshi public plants, the cost appears to be increasing (Figure 5). Among the operational 258 
power plants, GT, ST and CCPP have been generating the most of electricity in Bangladesh in the 259 
last three decades in both public and private sectors. For the cost evolution analysis, the relatively 260 
new or less utilized technologies (subcritical, ultra-supercritical and hydro) are not considered. Solar 261 
PV, nuclear are new technologies compared to CCPP or GT in Bangladesh. The capital cost trend of 262 
CCPP is following a second order polynomial and augmenting after 2010. In the case of the similar 263 
technology, the private sector is showing a linear descending trend with only two data points. 264 
Establishing cost of public GT/ST trend is third order polynomial and increasing after 2014. 265 
However, private power plants with similar technology, demonstrating a second order polynomial 266 
trend with a reduction in cost. 267 
<Insert Figure 5 about here> 268 
Independent-samples T-test was conducted to compare the capital cost in public and private owned 269 
power plants. The cost of GT/ST and CCPP technologies were considered for the tests. In the case of 270 
GT/ST, there was a significant difference in the capital cost of public (M=1226.09, SD=360.62) and 271 
private (M=751.68, SD=108.80) owned power plants; t(11.97)=4.16, p=0.001. These results suggest 272 
that GT/ST power plant ownership depending on being public and private influences its capital cost. 273 
The test results suggest that public power plants have higher capital cost. In the case of CCPP, there 274 
was not a significant difference in the capital cost of public (M=1075.33, SD=263.21) and private 275 
(M=704, SD=203.60) owned power plants; t(19)=1.92, p=0.070. These results suggest that CCPP 276 
power plant ownership depending on being public and private does not influence its capital cost. 277 
However, the private CCPP power plants number was only two. With more data points in the future, 278 
this analysis may be improved.  279 
3.2 Corruption 280 
Several reports and articles suggested that there has been significant evidence of corruption in 281 
electricity generation projects and operations, as well as in distribution system in Bangladesh (Khan 282 
& Rasheduzzman, 2013; TIB, 2016; Khan, 2007; Kenny, 2007; D'costa, 2012; IBP, 2012; Ruth, 283 
2002; Hossain & Tamim, 2005/06). The measurement of corruption is complicated as it depends on 284 
complex variables (Galtung, 2006). Therefore, no single source or polling method has yet been 285 
developed that can provide a convincing methodology (Lambsdorff, 2006). Transparency 286 
International started CPI score for different countries in 1995 to put the issue of corruption on the 287 
international policy agenda (TI, 2017). For this study, CPI score for Bangladesh was adopted to be 288 
analysed with the capital cost of power plants in the same year to examine the effect of corruption on 289 
cost evolution. Before 2012, CPI scores were ranked 0-10. However, the scale was amended in 2012 290 
to the range of 0-100, to demonstrate the better effect of corruption on the economy of a country (TI, 291 
2012). The CPI scores before 2012 were converted to 0-100 scale by multiplying 10 with the scores 292 
to compare the data from 2004-16. Higher CPI score is interpreted as lower corruption, which may 293 
result in reduced capital cost and vice versa (Figure 6A&B). Only 42 public and private power plants 294 
(among studied 61) cost data, which were built within 2004-16, were found and analyzed in this 295 
correlation study. The cost data scarcity worked as a limitation in rendering a detailed relationship. 296 
With increased data available in the future, the correlation may improve. Independent-samples T-test 297 
was conducted to compare the capital cost in public and private owned power plants. There was a 298 
significant difference in the capital cost of public (M=1156.20, SD=332.40) and private (M=734.26, 299 
SD=118.29) owned power plants; t(40)=4.09, p=0.000. These results suggest that being public and 300 
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private owned influences its capital cost. The test results suggest that public power plants have higher 301 
capital cost. 302 
<Insert Figure 6 about here>  303 
To assess the relationship between the CPI score and the capital cost of power plants in Bangladesh, 304 
Pearson’s test for normally distributed interval data was conducted. There was a negative correlation 305 
between the two variables, r = -0.477, n = 42, p = 0.001(Table 4). Figure 7 summarizes the results 306 
and demonstrated that corruption in Bangladesh is negatively related to a capital cost of power plants 307 
with R2=0.32 for annual CPI scores. Overall, there was a strong, negative correlation between 308 
corruption and capital cost of power plants. Decreases in corruption (increase in annual CPI score) 309 
were correlated with increased capital cost of power plants. Corruption is a continual socio-economic 310 
phenomenon traversing through years from megaproject construction and operation. CPI score 311 
represents an annual performance of a country. Whereas the power plant megaproject constructions 312 
usually go on for 2-7 years (GoB, 2015). Furthermore to the Pearson’s correlation test between 313 
annual CPI score and capital costs, additional correlation study was undertaken in this research to 314 
explore the relationship of the cost with biannual, triannual and quadrennial average CPI scores. The 315 
main objective of the study was to examine the correlation between different temporal CPI scores and 316 
capital costs. Table 4 summarizes the results. Figure 7 illustrated that the correlation R2 value was 317 
better between the biannual CPI score and capital cost. However, the Pearson’s correlation test 318 
showed that the best relationship was between the annual CPI scores and capital costs as the p-value 319 
was the lowest (Table 4). 320 
<Insert Table 4 about here>  321 
<Insert Figure 7 about here>  322 
The upper and lower limits of cost reduction per CPI score increase were $116.94 /kW and 323 
$45.47 /kW respectively. In some cases, the capital cost of public plants was two times higher than 324 
that of the private ones for the similar technology and time frame. Therefore, Bangladesh can reduce 325 
their cost of establishing power plants by reducing corruption. The power plant projects are 326 
expensive, and the government takes 66-94% (GoB, 2015) of the total cost of loans from banks and 327 
aid organisations such as World Bank, Asian Development Bank. Higher capital cost means a more 328 
significant loan from funding bodies, which the government have to repay in the future from the 329 
revenues. Larger repayment can put pressure on the economy and people.  330 
One of the reasons behind this significant corruption was the lack of governance in the energy sector. 331 
Implementing ‘Quick Enhancement of Electricity and Energy Supply (Special Provisions) Act, 2010’ 332 
enabled the government and responsible departments with authority to take rapid energy 333 
development initiatives while bypassing the 2006 public procurement law, with easy and quick 334 
procurement procedure for investing in the energy sector outside the bar of jurisdiction of the court 335 
(GoB, 2016). Laws such as ‘Quick Enhancement of Electricity and Energy Supply (Special 336 
Provisions) Act, 2010’ raised significant concern regarding transparency allowing enhanced scope 337 
for corruption among the donors (Choudhury, et al., 2010). The findings of this study suggest that the 338 
corruption may have influenced the higher cost of power plants in the past and increased after the 339 
implementation of the special provisions act (2010). 340 
4 Conclusion 341 
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As a rapidly developing economy, Bangladesh has been establishing and will continue to build more 342 
power plants to support the growing demand for electricity. Literature suggested that there is a lack 343 
of research on the cost analysis of the rapidly growing energy sector in Bangladesh; partially because 344 
of the data inadequacy and lack of transparency in the government. Initially, a cost databased was 345 
compiled from different resources for this study. For analyzing the cost of installing power plants in 346 
Bangladesh, the cost (public and private) data were compared with the world. The results 347 
demonstrated an intriguing aspect of a rapidly developing economy. Most of the public plants 348 
showed higher capital cost compared to the world average. Also, the cost of similar power generation 349 
technologies in private and public sector has a significant difference in Bangladesh. On top of the 350 
higher capital cost, the cost evolution demonstrated that cost of establishing public power plants is 351 
augmenting with time, whereas its opposite in private sector as well as in the world. In the case of 352 
expanding cost, this study showed a significant correlation between corruption and higher cost of 353 
power plants. Higher corruption may increase the cost of a power plant in a developing context such 354 
as Bangladesh.  355 
This study renders the opportunity to focus on the amendable condition of corruption within the 356 
governmental system to reduce the cost of establishing public power plants in Bangladesh. The 357 
government should implement more transparent and supervised system for establishing power plants 358 
to reduce the adverse influences of corruption on the megaprojects. Otherwise, there is a possibility 359 
the expensive power plants would become into ‘white elephant’ projects (Ross & Staw, 1993; Lewis 360 
& Williams, 1985), where the output is smaller than that of investment. The higher cost would 361 
impose an additional burden on the future economy.  362 
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1961-80 - - - - - 1 - 1 1.6% 
1981-00 2 1 - - - 2 - 5 8.2% 
2001-10 2 2 1 - - - - 5 8.2% 
2011-20 20 24 1 - 2 - - 47 77.0% 
2021-30 - - - 2 - - 1 3 4.9% 
Ownership 
  
Public 12 26 2 2 2 3 1 48 78.7% 
Private 11 2 - - - - - 13 21.3% 
Fuel 
  
Natural gas 10 24 - - - - - 34 60.7% 
Oil 9 - - - - - - 9 16.1% 
Duel fuel 5 3 - - - - - 8 14.3% 
Coal - - 2 2 - - - 4 7.1% 




<10 - - - - 2 - - 2 3.3% 
10-100 8 7 - - - 3 - 18 29.5% 
101-200 9 3 1 - - - - 13 21.3% 
201-300 6 4 1 - - - - 11 18.0% 
301-400 - 11 - - - - - 11 18.0% 
401-500 - 3 - - - - - 3 4.9% 




500-600 1 2 - - - 1 - 4 6.6% 
601-700 4 1 - - - - - 5 8.2% 
701-800 2 1 - - - - - 3 4.9% 
801-900 6 4 - - - - - 10 16.4% 
901-1000 2 4 - - - - - 6 9.8% 
1001-1100 - 5 - - - 1 - 6 9.8% 
1101-1200 2 2 - - - - - 4 6.6% 
1201-1300 1 3 1 - - - - 5 8.2% 
1301-1400 2 1 - - - - - 3 4.9% 
1401-1500 2 1 - - - - - 3 4.9% 
1501-1600 - - - - - - - 0 0.0% 
1601-1700 1 2 - - - - - 3 4.9% 
1701-1800 - - - - - - - 0 0.0% 
1801-1900 1 - - - - - - 1 1.6% 
1901-2000 - - 1 - - - - 1 1.6% 
2001-3000 - - - 1 1 - - 2 3.3% 
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3001-4000 - 1 - 1 - - - 2 3.3% 
4001-5000 - - - - 1 - - 1 1.6% 
5001-6000 - - - - - - 1 1 1.6% 




Table 2. Test of normality. The data is normal because of the Sig. Value of the Shapiro-Wilk Test 1 











Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
$/kW 
25 .172 14 .200* .882 14 .062 
26 .139 7 .200* .974 7 .925 
27 .185 7 .200* .916 7 .442 
* This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a CPI has been omitted when CPI Index are 15, 20 and 24 because $/kW is constant. 
b Lilliefors Significance Correction 
  
Table 3. The capital cost of power generation plants in the World and Bangladesh. Power plants in Bangladesh are further disaggregated 11 




Capital cost (US$(2015)/kW) 
World Bangladesh (public) Bangladesh (private) Difference in Mean 













361 741 551 190 680 1823 1177 336 545 1495 819 235 258 -626 -268 
CCPP* 568 1381 974 407 545 3005 1164 505 560 848 704 144 460 -189 270 
Coal Subcritical 619 2168 1394 774 1245 1924 1584 479 
    
 -191  
Ultra-
supercritical 
826 2374 1600 774 2867 3820 3343 477 
    
 -1743  
Renewa
ble 
Solar PV* 1910 6198 4054 2144 2391 4907 3649 1258 
    
 405  
Hydro-
electric* 
1755 3977 2866 1111 543 6409 2676 2648 
    
 190  
Nuclear Nuclear** 2065 6883 4474 2409 
 
5625 5625 
    
    
* CCGT, Solar photovoltaics - Large-scale and Hydropower - large-scale in International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Investment Outlook 2014 
(IEA, 2014) 
** There is only one planned nuclear power plant in Bangladesh. Caution should, therefore, be applied when interpreting the difference in mean. 
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Table 4. Pearson correlation test between CPI score and capital cost per installed capacity of power plants in Bangladesh 15 
 Annual CPI (-) Biannual average CPI 
(-) 




Capital cost ($/kW) 
Pearson Correlation -.565** -.445** -.430** -.396** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .003 .004 .010 
N 42 42 42 42 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 16 
Figure 1. (A) Population of Bangladesh (1960-2015); (B) Access to electricity (1970-2015); (C) Annual GDP growth (1960-2015); (D & H) Fuel types for 
electricity generation in 1980 and 2015. The total installed capacity was 438 and 12504.37 MW respectively in 1980 and 2015 (28.5 times increase in 35 years); 
(E) Electricity generation in Bangladesh (1970-2013); (F) Fuel use for electricity generation (1970-2013; (G) Electricity consumption per capita (1971-2014). 

























































































































































































































Figure 2. GDP per capita vs. electric power consumption for Bangladesh (1971-2011) 
(WB 2016)





































Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)
Figure 3. Capital cost comparison among fossil fuelled power plants from the world 
with Bangladesh. In the case of GT/ST and CCPP, Bangladeshi public power plant’s 
mean capital cost is higher than that of the mean of private and world counterparts. 
Surprisingly, private power plant’s mean capital cost was lower than the world mean for 
CCPP. Subcritical coal plant means capital cost is slightly higher than that of global 
mean. However, ultra-supercritical mean capital cost of Bangladesh would be 




(D) Coal: Ultra-supercritical 
Figure 4. Capital cost comparison among nuclear and renewable power plants from 
different country/regions with Bangladesh. In the case of solar PV plants, mean capital cost 
of Bangladesh is lower than the world mean. However, the installed capacity is only 12 
MW. Mean capital cost for hydroelectric plants is also lower than that of global mean capital 
cost. The reason behind this lower cost is the later units were in the same plant side, which 
reduced the ancillary cost. For nuclear only one plant is going to be built in Bangladesh by 
2030 and its cost would be significantly higher than that of the world mean capital cost.
(C) Nuclear
(A) Solar PV plants
(B) Hydroelectric
Figure 5. Cost evolution of different power generation technologies. In the case of coal, one 
subcritical power plants and two future ultra-supercritical ones not sufficient to see the cost 
evolution. For hydroelectric, solar PV and nuclear, the power plant numbers are insufficient 
for analysis of learning rate or cost evolution. Under these circumstances, highly utilized 
technologies such as gas turbine/engine and CCPP for public and private power plants were 
analyzed for cost evolution.
y = 1.3124x3 - 7905.7x2 + 2E+07x - 1E+10
R² = 0.4968
y = 7.7916x2 - 31321x + 3E+07
R² = 0.6137






































GT/ST (Public) CCPP (Public) GT/ST (Private)
CCPP (Private) Poly. (GT/ST (Public)) Poly. (CCPP (Public))
Poly. (GT/ST (Private))
Figure 6. (A) Average capital cost (2004-2016) and (B) CPI score (2004-2016). Chart ‘B’ is 
demonstrating that CPI index is not gradually reducing. Moreover, the average capital cost 












































Figure 7. Corruption vs. capital cost analysis for Bangladeshi power plants; (A) Normalized 
capital cost vs. average annual CPI scores, (B) Normalized capital cost vs. average biannual 
CPI scores, (C) Normalized capital cost vs. average triannual CPI scores, and (D) 
Normalized capital cost vs. average quadrennial CPI scores. 
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